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George Barker*
I Introduction
The last ten years in New Zealand are widely recognised to have seen a revolution in
economic policy and a transformation of the New Zealand economy. What is less widely
understood is that the last ten years have in conjunction, and even at root, also involved a
revolution in legal thought and analysis. This revolution in turn was made possible by
significant advances that were made in the economic analysis of organisations and
institutions, and which occurred over a longer period covering the last twenty to thirty
years.
This new kind of so-called institutional economics can play a much greater role in the
analysis of law, and can provide insights on the way people organise their private affairs
across a wide front.1 This approach has already enriched and complemented the more
strictly legal or "black letter" approach to law often taught in law schools, and is likely to
continue to do so.
The legal profession in New Zealand however appears to have been slow to appreciate
this fundamental change in thought and its implications for how they do business. The fact
that this may be changing is suggested by the recent formation of the Law and Economic
Association of New Zealand and the appearance of greater "economic content" in the
judgments of the higher courts.
* DPhil (Oxon), MA (Hons), BA/LLB. Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria
University of Wellington and Chief Analyst The New Zealand Treasury. The views expressed are
solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of his employers.
1 Thus it can encompass not only the analysis of commonly accepted economic institutions such as
for profit firms and markets, but also voluntary organisations and the family. On the latter see for
example R Pollak "A Transaction Costs Approach to Families and Households" (1985) 23 Journal of
Economic Literature, 581.
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This paper seeks to bring the main elements of this new economic approach to law and
policy to a wider legal audience. It seeks to review the main features of the recent and
significant advances that have been made in the economic analysis of organisations and
institutions over the last 20 to 30 years. The emphasis is on developments in the theoretical
literature.
A key characteristic of this new approach is a greater emphasis on positive analysis,2
with the focus being on the nature and role of institutions in influencing individual
decision making and therefore key economic and social outcomes over time. In this new
approach no institution is expected to be perfect, nor perform equally well in all
circumstances, nor perform as well for all time. Instead the performance of all institutions is
subject to review, with performance judged relative to the performance of well elaborated
real world alternative institutional options, given a clear set of objectives (eg justice,
fairness, economic growth, freedom etc).
This approach attracted considerable attention in the 1980's in light of evidence that for
a long period New Zealand's institutions had failed to meet the purposes for which they
were established. The need to identify the reasons why, and what could be done about it
was reinforced by the small open economy status of New Zealand. The country could not
continue underperforming economically relative to other countries without facing the
inevitable flight of capital, people and demand for outputs and services to better shores.
The paper is divided into five sections. The next section discusses the fundamental
factors which have to be recognised as constraints on the ability to secure an ideal society.
The problem then is one of identifying methods of social organisation that overcome or
minimise the effect of these constraints, not the pursuit of options that assume them away.
The third section of this paper discusses how private arrangements seek to overcome these
constraints and the limits to their success. The fourth section discusses the role of the state
in alleviating or overcoming problems with private solutions. A major theme of this section
is the need to recognise that the state is not an omniscient and omnicompetent solver of
social problems, but rather is subject to largely the same pitfalls that face private solutions
to social problems, and other ones as well. The concluding section attempts to identify the
2 Or theoretical and empirical analysis of the way the world is as opposed to purely normative
analysis of how it ought to be.
3 An institution can be defined as a set of collectively defined rules and sanctions both both formal
and informal. John Commons defined an institution as "collective action in control of individual
action". J R Commons The Economics of Collective Action (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison,
1970). North defines an institution as "the humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos,
customs, traditions and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).
(D North "Institutions" (1991) 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 97.)
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key factors that need to be considered in comparing alternative means for achieving social
goals.
II Constraints on the Achievement of Social Goals
The basic constraint a society faces is the scarcity of resources (both physical and
human) relative to the demands that can be placed upon them. There is a need to use
physical and human resources efficiently, to make them go further, and to ensure that the
uses to which they are allocated are those that are most highly valued. Scarcity then is the
most fundamental constraint of all. It implies the need to find means to reconcile the
demands of different claimants for the use of scarce resources. This process needs to ensure
that resources are not wasted, and that they are employed in their most socially valued use.
Moreover we live in an interdependent world. Scarcity of resources in itself is a major
source of such interdependencies. One person's use of a resource is likely to impact on
another person either beneficially or detrimentally. Society needs to find methods of
organisation that ensure interdependencies among individuals are resolved in a way that
takes account of the welfare of all those affected.
A further constraint on the effective achievement of social goals is uncertainty.
Uncertainty about the future and about the consequences of certain actions derives from
what may be called the bounded rationality of individuals and the inevitability of
complexity and change. Bounded rationality, is the inability of humans to comprehend fully
the nature of their environment, to anticipate or devise strategies to cope with change and to
communicate effectively with each other. If individuals could fully anticipate and
understand the network of causes and effects that exist, planning, both private and public,
would be a relatively simple task. The future could be anticipated, and shaped, or strategies
to cope with inescapable occurrences devised. Given the existence of bounded rationality,
people must plan on the basis of a largely uncertain future, and they are forced to adapt to
change and adopt strategies that minimise risks. Uncertainty then becomes something to be
managed, never eliminated.
4 The development of this concept is most associated with H A Simon Models ofMan (John Wiley &
Sons, New York, 1953
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Beyond the problem of bounded rationality there is the problem of obtaining
information.5 People may have the ability to make correct judgments but unless they have
access to information, they will simply be unable to exercise their judgment. The acquisition
of information involves costs, it is not free and for this reason it is also valuable. It is
therefore something to be searched out, bought and produced. As with other scarce
resources however, trade-offs have to be made. There is always some point at which it
ceases to be economic to search for more information about problems or solutions. The
benefits from further pursuing information need to be weighed against the costs.
A final constraint on our ability to achieve social goals is that individuals do not
always have the purest or most saintly of motivations. Individuals are at least in part
motivated by a concern for themselves. People thus have opportunistic tendencies.6 The
organisation of society towards the achievement of social goals would be immensely easier
if individuals were always generous, altruistic, honest and forgiving. When they are
selfish, jealous, deceptive and spiteful then the costs of social organisation are raised.
Individuals will therefore face difficulties in interacting and will need to protect themselves
against the opportunism of others. The appropriate response to this problem is not to
assume people ought to be different rather it is to devise means of organisation that limit the
adverse consequences of opportunistic tendencies.
The problem of opportunism can be understood as a subset or manifestation of a more
general problem - the problem of ensuring that individuals face incentives that align their
interests with those of others.7 It is a problem fundamental to social organisation. How
can people's incentives be aligned so that for instance shirking at the workplace, or
uncooperative behaviour or white collar crime, or neglect of scarce resources is reduced?
5 Seminal work on the economics of information includes: G J Stigler "The Economics of
Information" (1961) 69 Journal of Political Economy, 213; K Arrow "Limited Knowledge and
Economic Analysis" (1974) 64 American Economic Review 1; A Alchian and H Demsetz
"Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organisation" (1972) 62 American Economic
Review, 777; GA Akerlof "The Market for Lemons: Quantity Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism" (1970) 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488; and A M Spence "Job Market
Signalling" (1976) 87 Quarterly Journal of Economics 355.
6 Oliver E Williamson is best know for emphasising this condition in the economic analysis of
organisations: for which see O E Williamson Markets and Heirarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implications (Free Press, New York, 1975); and OE Williamson The Economic Institutions Of Capitalism
(Free Press, New York 1985).
7 A key early part of the literature focusing on this problem was principal agent theory. The term
principal-agent problem is due to S Ross "The economic theory of agency: the principals problem"
(1973) 63 American Economic Review 134. For an early review see J W Pratt and R J Zeckhauser
(eds) Principles and Agents: The Structure of Business (Harvard University Press, Boston, 1985).
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In combination, these problems of scarcity, interdependence, uncertainty (or bounded
rationality), the costs of information, and the problem of opportunism (or incentives) make
social organisation towards desired goals an immensely difficult task. There will therefore
be significant costs in social and economic interaction that may be generally described as
transactions costs. The fundamental problem then is to discover methods of social
organisation that relax or minimise these constraints in order to most efficiently marshall
the activities of individuals towards common or consistent ends. To ignore these problems
is to ignore the fundamental issues in social organisation. In the next section we discuss the
way in which private arrangements evolve to cope with these problems.
III 17:e Role and Limits of Private Arrangements
This section seeks to interpret many of our institutions, organisations and practices as
means by which individuals separately and as groups seek to adapt to the basic problems
underlying social organisation pointed to above.
A The Role of Exchange
Interdependencies and the problem of scarcity are in fact resolved most frequently
through private parties voluntarily contracting with each other to reconcile their interests.
An example of voluntary contracting overcoming interdependencies is when neighbours
come to an agreement about the nature of the fence that should separate their properties.
Through voluntary contracting individuals can further organise solutions to the problem of
scarcity. Individuals in local communities (before the state education system) contracted
together to ensure provision of local schools. This can be seen as an organisational
innovation that permitted more effective use of a local teacher's time, a scarce resource.
Trade is a process in which, through voluntary contracting, scarce resources flow to
their most highly valued uses. In a situation where someone values a resource more highly
than its current owner, a transfer of ownership is likely to be possible, with the purchaser
being able to compensate the current owner out of the additional value he or she places on
it. Thus through exchange, social welfare can be improved. Even the least technologically
advanced societies practice barter, a form of exchange. The feature of modern exchange
economies however is that they have developed a sophisticated monetary system (another
institution) that facilitates exchange and avoids the problems in barter where both parties
in an exchange have to have a commodity the other wants. Through voluntary contracts,
either based on barter or by through money, ownership titles to resources are transferred,
ensuring that resources flow towards those who value them the most.
Voluntary exchange governed by contracts and markets is thus a powerful process that
allows interdependencies between individuals to be reconciled, facilitates organisational
solutions to the problem of scarcity and enables scarce resources to flow to their most
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highly valued uses. In the context of simple transactions or exchanges, market contracting
has many beneficial features.
The general arguments for the use of markets or private contracting as potential means of
solving economic and social problems tend to focus on three main features of markets - first
how markets enable efficient use to be made of information, second how markets, through
the price mechanism, co-ordinate individual actions and resolve interdependencies, third
how market competition puts in place a selection mechanism that over time tends to guide
resources to those users and uses that maximise the value of production secured from the
resources, as measured by consumers' willingness to pay. Markets at their best resolve
conflicts impersonally and ensure that over the longer term less efficient producers are
penalised and the more efficient rewarded. In the following discussion we consider each of
the above points in more detail.
As institutions for consummating exchange, the role of markets in ensuring efficient use
of information becomes apparent when it is realised that the acquisition of information has
costs, and in many circumstances is difficult to transfer from one person to another. In such
circumstances it is better if those with ready access to information, or those in possession of
relevant specialised information attempt to find their own solutions, rather than risk ill
informed interventions by third parties. Various organisational forms have evolved which
allow specialisation in the production of information. These include such things as rating
agencies, brokers of various sorts, research departments within firms, private educational
organisations, and labour exchanges.
The notion that the price mechanism is an efficient means of co-ordinating individuals'
action is in many ways also based on informational considerations. A price system can
operate in a low cost manner to transmit to individuals wishing to claim the use of scarce
resources the competing claims upon its use or the returns the resources can earn in
alternative uses, and also the costs of their production in one simple signal. In a similar
way to traffic lights, the major virtue of the price mechanism is its simplicity in both
signalling information and co-ordinating behaviour.
Substantial empirical work indicates that prices do reflect and convey information
about the extent of competing claims and costs of production to market participants. On the
basis of prices individuals are then able to make production and consumption decisions in a
way that incorporates wider social claims on resources. Efficient markets force
individuals to make choices about the priorities they have, reconcile their demands with
those of others and further provide incentives for individuals to conserve the use of
resources wisely. All of these are socially desirable outcomes.
Significant resistance to the use of private markets is frequently based on the view that
individuals searching for private gain will be unconstrained resulting in undesirable
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consequences such as exploitation, unfair trading and monopoly practices. Such market
practices however are often disciplined by the market itself through competition.8 If
through exploitation or unfair trading an individual or firm can earn a return in a
particular activity that is above that earned elsewhere then there will exist incentives for
others to enter the market and compete, thereby undermining the longer term survival
prospects of such practices. Thus economic rents and privileges tend to be transient in the
context of competitive processes, and are likely to develop and persist in the context of
arrangements that inhibit such processes.
Decentralised markets based on competition also have many virtuous dynamic
properties that make them preferable in many circumstances to protected markets or
centralised control. More important than the short run competition based on price,
described in the last paragraph, is the competition that imposes a selection process on
different methods of organising production and distribution, and at the same time provides
incentives to discover new opportunities, new ways of doing things, new products and
services. Competition creates an evolutionary process that tends to ensure that private
ordering through markets is subject to evolution on all fronts over time, while also
providing a check against abuse of power and privilege. Competition and markets can thus
be seen as organisational arrangements that economically allow individuals to undertake
mutually beneficial transactions while aligning the interests of the individual with those of
a society.
B Limits to Markets
Private contracting nevertheless clearly faces limitations. The major sources of
problems with private contracting are uncertainty, information problems and opportunism
which were discussed in the earlier section. In the context of uncertainty individuals will
face problems contracting about future events. For example a contract for the delivery of
goods is complicated if the price of the goods may change according to movements in foreign
exchange rates. Information costs also raise the costs of contracting. In particular
individuals face costs searching out and evaluating potential contracting partners. An
unemployed resident of Whangarei attempting to search for a job in Auckland or Wellington
clearly faces considerable information problems. Finally, if individuals are opportunistic
or incentives are not well aligned then people face costs contracting with each other. For
example if one pays for goods in advance of delivery one faces the risk that the supplier will
either not deliver or deliver poorly.
It is clear nevertheless that these problems are unlikely to be uniformly present in all
exchange transactions. Voluntary contracting is thus likely to be efficient in the context of
8 For a discussion of such "unfair" contractual terms see B Klein "The Transaction Cost
Determinants of 'Unfair' Contractual Arrangements" (1980) 70 American Economic Review 356.
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simple exchange relations such as those involved in auction markets, where there are many
buyers and sellers and information is easily obtained. Capital markets exhibit these
features. Even less perfect markets can nevertheless work well. Consider the new car
market. Information can be relatively readily obtained by viewing the cars on sale or by
testing them, and one can compare prices for different makes and models by simply walking
around the market.
Problems will arise with voluntary contracting however when there are difficulties in
measuring the quality of the goods being sold.9 Measurement problems result from the
existence of information costs and bounded rationality. They arise in goods markets where
the goods are complex, but more particularly in the context of sales of services, especially
expert services provided by professionals such as doctors, lawyers, or accountants.
Problems also arise where the parties to the contract are engaged in a long term
relationship supported by investments specifically tailored to the trading relation and
reliant upon its continuity (that is, transaction specific assets).10 An example of such a
situation includes that of a manufacturer who requires a steady supply of a unique piece of
equipment not used by anyone else. In these circumstances the supplier may have to change
his/her production processes to meet the specialised demand and be unable at low cost to
turn to the production of alternative goods. In these situations there are a small number of
buyers and sellers and bargaining will be complicated by the existence of information costs,
bounded rationality and opportunism. The parties for instance will need to safeguard their
relation against uncertain events. The absence of large numbers of alternative buyers or
sellers with a coincidence of needs further means there is greater potential for haggling over
the terms of trade, and for opportunistic behaviour.
Such behaviour however absorbs resources. Consequently private individuals seek to
anticipate such occurrences by crafting safeguards in their contracts, or by seeking out
alternative organisational forms that minimise problems. Examples of such private
endeavours to minimise the problems facing social and economic organisation are discussed
below. The main examples are complex contracting, the firm, and the club or voluntary
association.
9 For a discussion of the problems information and measurement costs create for the operation of
markets see G A Akerlof "The Market for Lemons: Quantity Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism" (1970) 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488; and Y Barzel "Transaction Costs: Are
They Just Costs?" (1985) 141 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 4.
10 For an analysis of contracting problems in the context of specific assets see Williamson (1985)
above n 6 and Alchian and S Woodward "Reflections on The Theory of The Firm" (1987) 143
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 110.
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C Complex Contracting
Frequently when difficulties arise with private contracting, individuals develop
organisational arrangements or practices which seek to minimise these problems. In more
complex settings, or non-auction settings, non-standard or complex contracting emerges.
Examples of non-standard contracting practices include entry fees, marketing restrictions
and some types of franchising. These practices often appear unfair at first glance and
suspiciously like monopolistic restrictions. However, they may be necessary in order to
reduce uncertainty or scope for opportunism between the supplier and consumer, thereby
making it economic for one party to invest in a specialised technique. Seen in this light such
practices can be efficient. Frequently such non-standard or complex arrangements reduce
the capacity of parties to a contract to renege or change the terms of an agreement. These
restrictions can also be understood as efficiency enhancing particularly when there are the
measurement problems or a small numbers bargaining situation pointed to earlier. In such
cases the problems created for contractual partners by opportunism, are likely to be severe.
For instance if the quality of a good or service is hard to measure then it will be easier for
one party to cheat another.11
Reliance on a third party may be resorted to in order to deal with contracting
difficulties. This is likely to take the form of privately arranged arbitration procedures that
are more sensitive to the needs of the parties than the use of common law courts constrained
as they are to apply general rules with little ongoing knowledge of the facts.
Perhaps the most frequent method besides arbitration relied upon by private parties to
limit opportunism is the creation of what may be called credible commitments.12 Individual
contractors may deliberately agree to commit themselves at the outset. Such commitments
may serve to tie their own hands at a later date from behaving opportunistically. The
arrangements likely to emerge here are similar to the mutual creation of hostages. Examples
include bonds required by landlords of tenants and vested pension funds offered by
employers. These types of contractual arrangements can be understood as attempts by
landlords to protect themselves against opportunistic tenants, and attempts by employers to
protect investments they may make in the training of workers. Sometimes however these
arrangements may appear unfair and explanations are advanced that suggest that one party
is using market power to extract unfair terms. One needs to be careful however to examine
the detail and background to the creation of these apparently unfair terms.13 They may
11 See Williamson (1985) above n 6.
12 For a discussion of credible commitments see Williamson (1985) above n 6.
13 See B Klein (1980) above n 8 for a discussion of this point.
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often be better understood as attempts to safeguard integrity in a long-term relational
contract.
In addition, problems associated with uncertainty frequently give rise to complex
contracting. Individuals attempt to manage uncertainty. They take out insurance contracts,
they buy on futures markets, they employ specialists either full-time or on retainers, they
maintain inventories or they may merely self-insure through personal savings. Clearly
attempts to anticipate all future events are costly. Examples of 70 page commercial
contracts are not infrequent. In designing these contracting safeguards however individuals
will weigh costs against benefits, and design contractual arrangements that best suit their
needs over time.
To be sure, complex contracting restrictions that are observed may simultaneously serve
the efficiency purposes outlined above or other antisocial (for example monopolistic)
purposes. Here as elsewhere, where trade-offs are posed they need to be evaluated and the
virtues of private arrangements not underestimated.
D The Firm
The firm can similarly be interpreted as an organisational innovation that substitutes
internal organisation of production for contracting across markets by autonomous agents,
in order to minimise the costs of contracting.14 When a firm vertically integrates (or buys a
supplier of services), it may be attempting an organisational innovation that reduces the
costs of contracting. In these circumstances internal organisation may be more efficient than
discrete market or complex contracting. Substituting administrative control for market
relations may enable the pooling of information, improvements in communication and other
reductions in bounded rationality, greater monitoring and control of opportunistic
behaviour, co-ordination of production interdependencies and speedier resolution of
contracting disputes. There may be gains both in adaptability and from improving integrity
in exchange, by organising production within a firm. This is particularly likely in two
cases. First when the parties are committed to a long term contracting relationship through
the development of assets which are specific to their relationship and which have little
value in alternative uses, and second when there are serious problems measuring the quality
of a good or service provided, as in cases of team production.
The capitalist firm when viewed as an organisational innovation may be seen as
socially beneficial in the way it may ensure the efficient production of goods and services
for a market using team work. With team work it may be difficult to measure the
contribution of each team member and shirking (opportunism) may become a serious
14 This view was first advanced by R H Coase "The Nature of the Firm" (193D 4 Economica 368.
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problem.15 As the residual income or profits left after production is claimed by the owner of
a capitalist firm he or she has an incentive to monitor production and minimise production
costs in order to maximise his or her income.16 Over time this operates to the benefit of the
consumer as, through the increases in productivity it enables, and through competition,
prices may be expected to fall. Moreover the existence of the capitalist as a residual risk
taker or the party accepting the costs of uncertainty is also relevant to the assessment of the
firm as an effective organisational innovation. Fundamentally the capitalist firm may
enable specialisation in the management of risk or uncertainty.
Within the community there is often a general expression of hostility towards large
dominant firms. This view is based on a suspicion that the expansion of a firm into different
activities has monopoly purposes. Recent research however suggests that attempts to
expand or take control of different levels of production and distribution may be based on
the efficient adaptations of private individuals to eliminate the problems experienced with
market contracting outlined above.17
It is true nevertheless that firms can behave opportunistically and exploit a monopoly
advantage. The key question is, are there checks on this behaviour. In fact the number of
firms operating in a market, or dominance, may not be the critical factors, rather the ease
with which new firms can enter the market, or the threat of competition to, or contestability
of, the firm's activities may be the relevant element. If there are low barriers to entry then
checks upon monopoly behaviour will exist. Frequently, where they exist, barriers to entry
are in fact created by regulation. An alternative way of looking at the problem is to
examine the costs of exit from a contracting relationship that a purchaser or supplier has. If
these are low then there are checks on behaviour. Firms further need to maintain their
reputation. The potential loss of reputation therefore acts as a check. Monitoring by
consumers, by potential rivals, and by Government (involving the threat of regulation) are
all likely to act as a check on behaviour. Moreover co-operative organisations or
alternatives to the capitalist firm may be expected to survive over time if they are more
productive, so long as the legal framework is neutral. Basically one needs to be sensitive to
the incentives of private individuals to eliminate practices which are exploitative and take
precautions against them in mutually beneficial ways.
15 On this point see A Alchian amd H Demsetz "Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organisation" (1972) 62 American Economic Review 777.
16 See E F Fama and M C Jensen "Separation of Ownership and Control" (1983) 26 Journal of Law
and Economics 301-326, and Fama & Jensen "Agency Problems and Residual Claims" (1983b) 26
Journal of Law and Economics 327.
17 For a transaction cost explanation for multiproduct firms see D J Teece "Towards an Economic
Theory of the Multiproduct Firm" (1982) 3 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 39.
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The major problem that large internal organisations create however is a weakening of
incentives to perform. When transactions do not involve measurement problems, or specific
assets, markets can be more effective. Within a large firm the checks on shirking can be
comparatively low and the costs of monitoring and effectively encouraging efficient
production may be weaker than when transactions are organised across markets. Further,
bureaucratic rules and attitudes may hinder dynamic behaviour. These disabilities suggest
that individuals may rely more on market oriented solutions to contracting problems, that
may retain a higher level of competitive checks and incentives, such as those described
earlier when we discussed complex contracting.
The above suggests that the firm can be understood more broadly as an organisational
innovation or as a nexus of contracts between resource owners. Owners of labour, capital
and land join together to provide goods or services to a market in an organisational unit
that enables greater gains for each than independent or autonomous contracting.
E Voluntary Associations
Other coalitions of private individuals or organisational forms can be identified which
seek to pursue the mutual interests of members other than firms. These can be described as
voluntary associations and include among other institutions clubs, churches, and unions.
These coalitions can be understood as the creation of individuals contracting with each
other to deliver a good or service of benefit to themselves as a group.18 The services they
provide may benefit their members exclusively, or benefit the wider community (for example
a club house versus a public park). While the problem of poor incentives or opportunism
may arise in this context as well and limit the extent to which individuals may be able to
achieve collective goals the problems should not be over-emphasised. Indeed in one view
non-profits are an institutional response that may, for example, facilitate altruism by
donors to charities. In a related view non profits are seen to be a means of limiting
opportunism by service providers particularly in situations where consumers are poorly
informed relative to sellers. Consumers in such circumstances may prefer to rely on non-
profits, to the extent they may be assumed more reliable or trustworthy, and less likely to
exploit their informational advantage for short term profit. Information problems in judging
services of nursing homes, day care for children, blood banks, medical research,
18 Two seminal articles on voluntary associations are Buchanan "An Economic Theory of Clubs"
(1965) Economica 32, 1, and Olson The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1965). For a review of the literature on clubs see R C Comes and T Sandler The Theory
of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986). For
recent work analysing the role and economics of non-profits see B A Weisbrod The Non-Profit
Economy (Harvard University Press, 1988); and Susan Rose Ackerman (ed) The Non-projit Sector:
Economic Theory and Public Policy (Oxford University Press, 1988).
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environmental protection, and charities for the needy for example may explain the
dominance in these areas of non-profits,19
The main situation however where opportunism is thought to undermine the
effectiveness of voluntary associations arises in the case of public goods. A pure public
good can be defined in theory as a good that can be used by additional consumers at no
extra cost and for which it is not possible to exclude people from consumption (for example
a radio broadcast in the absence of coding). In the case of a pure public good poor
incentives or opportunism may lead some individuals to 'free ride' on the collective benefits
achieved by others from which they cannot be excluded. It is suggested that such
opportunistic behaviour may lead to the instability of clubs or associations which
voluntarily attempt to deliver pure public goods. This free rider problem can however be
over-emphasised. Generally, the stringency of the conditions for a good to be truly public,
needs to be recognised.20 Few goods are likely to involve zero marginal cost for use across
any significant range. Further, if the individual does not participate in clubs or
associations that may seek to provide public goods then the quantity or quality of public
goods that will exist will probably be reduced, hence a cost is incurred by non-participants
and their 'ride' is not free but rather cheap. In the extreme in fact the collective good or
service may not be provided at all. Moreover whether a good is truly public or not depends
on whether people can be excluded from its use. This may depend as much on the institution
used to produce it as on the nature of the good. For instance this is illustrated by decisions
about whether or not to charge admission to amusement parks. Similarly, cable television
has reduced the 'public' nature of television broadcasting.
The benefits of voluntary attempts to deliver goods are that they may ensure the goods
delivered are better tailored to the needs of the benefiting population. The decisions made
on what goods should be provided are made by club or association members, and
furthermore if a member disagrees with the ultimate decision of the group they can freely
leave the group and seek another one that better meets their needs. In this way voluntary
coalitions may be better able to satisfy demands for goods frequently seen to be of a public
nature than centrally determined solutions.
Two limitations of such solutions however are frequently suggested. First it may be
thought that in a heterogeneous society people joining clubs or voluntary associations to
provide services may lead to the segregation of peoples with consequent losses in social
cohesion. Cohesiveness however is not valued above all else and it may at times conflict
with another value, namely diversity. In fact, true social cohesion may only be attainable
19 For this view see Weisbrod (1988).
20 For a sceptical view on the evidence on the existence of public goods see Coase "The Lighthouse
in Economics" (1974) 17 Journal of Law and Economics 357-376.
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through greater tolerance of diversity. Moreover a voluntary association needs to be
recognised as a key institution that serves social cohesion by bringing individuals together
in collective endeavour.
Second it may be suggested that with a mobile society such private solutions to the
provision of certain goods may be undermined, particularly with regard to collective goods
that involve large set up costs. This suggests that reliance on voluntary associations for
provision of public services may hinder mobility. Mobility, however, has costs, and where
it is highly valued one might expect individuals to find means to facilitate it. Thus there may
be inherent tendencies towards appropriate systems of networking where cohesion and
mobility are valued by individuals.
F Conclusion
The above discussion attempts to indicate the useful role of private arrangements as
means for resolving conflicts of interests and achieving collective goals even in the context
of serious organisational difficulties. It attempts to point out common fallacies or
misconceptions about the poor effectiveness of private arrangements. At the same time it
emphasises that private arrangements have weaknesses or face limits. In particular private
arrangements are likely to face problems arising from information costs, bounded
rationality, opportunism and uncertainty. Our discussion in the section which follows goes
on to show that these problems are nevertheless common sources of failure of centralised
solutions. A relative assessment of the abilities of private versus centralised attempts at
solutions to social problems is therefore warranted.
IV The Role and Limits of the State
A The Role of the Law and the State
In the section on the constraints to achievement of social goals we identified five
problems which must be faced by individuals in organising their relations and activities.
These were the problems of scarcity, interdependence, uncertainty (or bounded rationality),
information costs, and opportunism (or inceniive problems).
The problems of scarcity and interdependence require solutions by which different
individuals' competing claims can be reconciled so that resources are not wasted but are
employed in their most socially valued use. The outcome will be the existence of rights
either in fact or in law. These rights will express relationships between individuals in
respect of the use of scarce resources, or actions which are a source of interdependence.
There are three basic elements to property rights over scarce resources. First is the right
to use the resource and to retain income accruing from its use. Second is the right to change
the nature of a resource (for example to put a factory on farm land). Third is the right to
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transfer these rights. The crucial feature of all of these rights is the extent to which they are
exclusive or good against all corners, or against the competing claims of others.
Exclusivity in property rights creates incentives for individuals to use resources
efficiently. To the extent that an individual or a group has an exclusive right to use and
transfer a resource, they will face incentives to use the resource well and to develop it.
With an exclusive right over land for instance one knows that if one fertilises the land, one
will be able to capture the benefits of its improved productivity, without risk of this greater
productivity being'stolen' perhaps by a neighbouring farmer's grazing herd. This improves
incentives to carefully husband and improve the land. Further with exclusive rights one can
sell or transfer the rights to others who may value them more highly. It can be claimed then
that, depending on the way they are specified, exclusive property rights can improve
incentives and enable more effective use and allocation of scarce resources, in comparison
to a situation where no one can claim exclusive title.
The fact that rights - de facto or de jure - express relationships between people however
implies the need for them to be mutually recognised for them to be observed. Rights can be
backed coercively, by less formal sanctions involving custom, social mores, or by contract.
In a process of voluntary contracting, rights or relations between individuals, both in
respect of scarce resources and each other, are continually being defined, allocated,
redefined and reallocated. The definition of rights through voluntary exchange is a dynamic
process that among other things responds to changes in technology, preferences, income,
relative prices, population and the need to minimise the general problems indicated above.
The process further involves decentralised decision making which enables quick
adaptations to new information and incentives.
In a process of private regulation based on voluntary exchange, individuals seek to
enforce and mutually recognise each others exclusive rights to use and transfer scarce
resources in an interdependent world. Such rights based on exchange are characterised by
a remarkable degree of durability or observance. The glue which makes a contract stick is
the mutual advantage that underlies it. The creation of exclusive rights over resources
through a contract is further likely to be socially beneficial as exclusive rights enhance the
incentives for individuals to use resources efficiently.
The above analysis raises a fundamental question about the role of the law. Given
contracting is permitted will the law have consequences, and more fundamentally is it
needed? The above suggests first of all that if legal rules allocating rights exist, but leave the
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legal rights tradeable1 and contracting costs are zero, it does not matter for efficiency what
the law actually says. In such conditions private parties will change any rule with adverse
consequences for efficiency by changing the rights created by the rule by agreement in order
to exploit the gains from exchange inherent in any departure from efficient outcomes. Coase
summed up this point in the so called Coase theorem by saying while:22
the delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market transactions ... the ultimate result
(which maximises the value of production) is independent of the legal decision.
Subsequently Cheung has taken this analysis one step further and argued that, even in a
world of scarcity and interdependence, if transaction costs are zero:23
the assumption of private property rights can be dropped without in the least negating the
Coase Theorem.
This is a view which Coase commented was "no doubt right".24 This suggests that even if
there is no initial allocation of rights by legal rules efficiency will result.25
One can identify at least six problems however with purely private regulation and
formation of rights. These problems are:
(a) Rights formed on the basis of contract alone are not likely to be respected by all
individuals, at best they may only be respected by those who are parties to the contract.
The problems of bounded rationality, information costs and opportunism can be
understood to lead to situations where no contract emerges to govern interdependencies
between people, and for uncontracted for effects to therefore emerge. This limited
coverage, and therefore exclusivity of contractually based rights undermines incentives
to use resources efficiently and may in fact undermine the operation of markets.
21 Whenever legal rules may be waived by agreement, or can be amended by private parties, then
the legal rights they establish can be termed "tradeable" or alienable. Thus if, for example, a legal
rule permits workers to sell their right to associate in employment, or their right to expect
unanimity in unions, or permits the firm to sell their right to be free of intimidation, then these
rights are tradeable, much like commodities.
22 Coase "The Federal Communications Commission" (1959) 2 Journal of Law and Economics, 1,25.
23 Cheung, Will China Go "Capitalist"? Hobart Paper 94 (London Institute of Economic Affairs,
London, 1986) 37.
24 Coase The Firm, The Market and The Law (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988) 15.
25 For empirical work on the private formation of property rights, without the state, in a positive
transaction cost world, see J Umbeck "Might Makes Rights: A Theory of The Formation and Initial
Distribution of Property Rights" (1981) 20 Economic Inquiry 38; and T L Anderson and P J Hill
"The Evolution of Property Rights; A Study of the American West" (1975) 18 Journal of Law and
Economics, 163.
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(b) Attempts by individuals to address this or create absolute exclusivity of rights may
lead them into conflict, either as individuals or groups.26 Depending on the co-
operative tendencies of people, unless there is a more powerful force, or an
organisation such as the state that can effectively monopolise coercive powers, the law
of the jungle may prevail. This tendency may lead to a situation where more resources
are wasted on enforcing exclusivity, than would be required if there was an
organisation such as the state that enforced rights on a generally accepted basis.27
(c) Those rights formed on the basis of exchange may moreover not even be respected even
by the parties to the exchange themselves. Given the condition of opportunism
highlighted above, it is going to be difficult to design self-enforcing agreements.28
Enforcement of contracts by a third party in possession of coercive powers may then
enhance the range and feasibility of exchange or contracts between individuals and
contribute to wealth creation through exchange.
(d) Fourth the costs of contracting facing individuals may mean that status quo rights
definitions that are not socially desirable, continue in existence. Essentially the
contracting costs facing private individuals attempting to change the current definition
of rights may preclude an appropriate or socially desirable adjustment. Consider a
status quo rights definition that effectively gave people the right to burn down
factories. Because of the high costs facing factory owners in identifying and
contracting with potential factory burners, such a rights definition is likely to persist
and give rise to more bumt factories, lower employment and lower consumer welfare,
when compared with an alternative rights definition that prohibited arson.29
(e) Fifth, it is usually felt that a purely private process of rights formation may not be
ethically desirable. It may be seen to be potentially inequitable and potentially lead to
a de facto situation where might defines rights.
26 See R Cooter "The Cost of Coase" (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies, 1 for a discussion of
"Hobbesian" versus "Coasean" bargaining assumptions that may characterise differences in view
on this. See J Umbeck "Might Makes Rights: A Theory of The Formation and Initial Distribution of
Property Rights" (1981) 20 Economic Inquiry 38 for a discussion of actual property rights
formation in the absence of the law during the Californian Gold rush.
27 See G S Becker "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" (1968) 76 Journal of Political
Economy 169 and G S Becker and G J Stigler "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation
of Enforcers" (1974) 3 Journal of Legal Studies 1 for formal economic models of an analysis of the
role of criminal law and its enforcement.
28 On self-enforcing agreements see Telser "A theory of self-enforcing agreements" (1981) 53 Journal
of Business 27.
29 See Demsetz (1982) 72 "Barriers to Entry The American Economic Review" 47,59 for a discussion
of this point.
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(f) Finally it is frequently felt that private arrangements may provide insufficient
safeguards for the dignity of people, leading to alienation with consequent losses in
overall welfare.
The basic conditions of scarcity, interdependence and the need to reconcile competing
claims through the definition of rights creates a need then for an institution that has a
monopoly on coercive powers and adjudicates on the rights of individuals where necessary.
This will involve both the allocation of initial rights where no contract exists, and the
enforcement of rights formed through agreement or exchange. This is perhaps the
fundamental explanation for the existence of government and law. It is the ultimate
safeguard to ensure that individuals in pursuit of their own self-interest reconcile their
competing claims through peaceful means, and undertake productive investments in
property, rather than waste resources, time and effort in violent and aggressive behaviour.
By defining initial rights and enforcing contracts it may also facilitate exchange, expand the
range of feasible contracts, and expand trade. In performing this role of enforcer and
specifier of rights the Government is clearly not performing a simply technical function, but
rather is expected to have regard to ethical criteria.
So far then we have elaborated how the role of the state as a monopolist of coercive
powers, that ultimately specifies and enforces property relations or rights, is central to the
effective operation of voluntary arrangements including markets. In such a context it may be
inappropriate to speak of government intervention in markets. Government involvement in
enforcing property and contracting rights may be necessary in order for markets to work. If
governments may be the basis of markets, to speak of them interfering in markets seems
slightly misplaced. Government involvement in markets is pervasive and therefore the
notion of a market totally free of government intervention may be meaningless. Indeed even
if a government did not exist one can suggest there would be a tendency for one to form out
of the demand by individuals for an organisation to enforce exclusive rights.
All the same the above analysis also highlights that as a prelude to any government
intervention it is important not to take the above conditions undermining private
arrangements as everywhere and always present. Rather detailed analysis of the existence,
nature and source of a problem in private arrangements needing to be addressed is needed.
The relevant questions then do not include whether or not in general Government should
exist or intervene but under what conditions and how. The question of how it intervenes is
also critical in this regard, as by its interventions in private arrangements the Government
may make matters worse. Thus in the same way as private arrangements may fail, so too
may government imposed ones. A detailed comparative assessment of consequences of actual
alternative options or choices, including leaving things as they are, is therefore what is
needed.
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In what follows we shall proceed to a discussion of the nature and consequences of the
various means the State has at its disposal for defining allocating and enforcing rights and
thereby affecting social outcomes,30
B The Courts and the Common Law
One option available is to leave the resolution of what legal rights should be created,
for whom and how, to court decision-making. Indeed the courts tend to reserve the right to
have the final say about disputes involving legal rights - subject to appeals to higher courts
and legislative intervention - leaving this option always open to the parties to a dispute.
Three main choices for enforcing legal decisions allocating rights are identifiable.31
These are an inalienability rule under which a right (eg freedom from slavery) is made
inalienable, second a so called property rule where a right is enforced by injunction (but the
parties are able to bargain to transfer the right), and a liability rule where the right is
enforced by compensatory damages (or where in essence the court determines the price for
the transfer of the right which may have occurred eg in a car accident). The courts moreover
ultimately have the sanction of coercively appropriating property or imprisoning
individuals who fail to observe their decisions and enforcement awards.
In comparison to relying on private ordering then what problems will judges face in
settling disputes? The role of bounded rationality and information problems in court
decision making is critical in this regard. Judges are human, they have difficulty forming
judgements. Even if they are assumed good at it they also however face information costs. If
all relevant information were public, or available to all parties and the court at zero cost,
then a court may be able to make a decision that approximates a value maximising exchange.
Where however there is information held privately by the parties, or where it is costly to
access information, then such an outcome is less likely. If information is held privately by
the parties then two situations are worth distinguishing. First a situation where
information is held privately by the parties, but in common. Thus both know the relevant
facts, but the court does not and faces costs accessing it. The second is where the
information is held privately by the parties but asymmetrically. Thus one party holds
information that the court and the other party do not
In either situation of private information it will be difficult for a court to minimise
transaction costs. Where transaction costs include both the direct costs of ensuring value
30 For general introductory texts on much of what is discussed in what follows see R Posner The
Economic Analysis of Law (3 ed, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1986) and R Cooter and R Ulen Law and
Economics (Scott Foresman & Co, Illinois, 1988); and D C Mueller Public Choice N (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1989).
31 Calabresi & Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One view from the
Cathedral" (1972) 85 Harvard L Rev 1089.
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maximising exchanges of rights occur, and the costs of exchanges that may be forgone
because they are too costly to consummate. The courts' capacity to perform well as an
institution of dispute resolution in the instant case will depend on the substantive legal
rules providing the basis of court intervention (including those of contract and tor02), the
remedies adopted for enforcing rights, and the legal procedures applying (eg evidence).
Whether poor legal decisions, which are no doubt then likely to emerge, then have
consequences for the efficiency of the relations that emerge as between the parties to the
case, depends on the parties' ability to bargain subsequently about the outcome to re-
arrange it, or appeal the decision. It would thus appear likely that poor decisions in a case
will persist and have adverse effects subsequently, to the extent information problems
between the parties are likely to have caused the original decision to take the dispute to
court, rather than settle privately.
One needs to add to this potential risk, the likely wider impact of legal decisions on
third parties, given the effect of legal precedent or the doctrine of stare decisis. The question
then becomes whether judges will be able to settle disputes that are generally efficient, not
only for the parties but for third parties as well. Will the basis of judgments in a particular
case for example be accurately enough stated so as to clearly signal the limits of its
application, and will those limits be appropriately set.
Clearly the costs of a court accurately assessing potential third party effects will again
be undermined by the information problems involved in such assessments. At the same time
however those involved in any litigation will have incentives to identify potential adverse
third party effects, basing their arguments on the public policy doctrines for legal decisions.
This may then provide a process in the particular cases for the limits of the decision to be
elaborated clearly and appropriately. This process however will be costly and imperfect
resulting in the likelihood of adverse third party effects.
The question then is whether third parties will be able to avoid the impact of such bad
decisions or eliminate them over time. Again this will depend on the costs of them agreeing
with others on the meaning and applicability of a particular decision and then bargaining
about its impact to re-arrange its possibly adverse consequences. It has been suggested
however that the process of litigation may provide a mechanism akin to natural selection
whereby inefficient legal rules are eliminated in the long run.33 This is based on an
32 See Cooter "Unity in Tort Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution" (1985) 73 Califomian
Law Review 1.
33 For seminal articles on this see Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?" (1977) 6 Journal of
Legal Studies 51; and G L Priest "The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules"
(1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 65. See also G L Priest "Selective Characteristics of Litigation",
(1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 399; G L Priest and B Klein "The Selection of Dispute for
Litigation" (1984) 23 Journal of Legal Studiesl; R Cooter and L Kornhauser "Can Litigation
A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO LAW AND LEGAL INSTNUTIONS PAGE 129
assumption that inefficient legal rules are more likely to be overturned than efficient ones,
because overturning them increases wealth, instead of potentially reducing it, or merely
redistributing it.
The efficient outcome could emerge in the long term even if judges do not consciously
favour efficiency; and even if they suffer bounded rationality. It would suffice if they do not
on average systematically favour either efficient or inefficient outcomes. If one assumes a
neutral judiciary, two effects may then generate a bias in the common law process towards
efficiency. First it is possible to argue that rational self-interested litigants will tend to
litigate inefficient decisions more frequently than efficient ones. This is true, with given
costs of litigation, to the extent the expected gains from litigating inefficient rules will be
higher than efficient ones (ie by definition, overturning inefficient rules increases the
potential value to be distributed between the parties). Second however it is also possible to
argue not only that inefficient rules will be more frequently litigated but that more will be
spent on the litigation of inefficient rules than efficient ones. This potentially implies better
prepared cases, and therefore better decisions in the particular case.
The above suggests a bias towards efficiency in the common law. This outcome however
depends fundamentally on the distribution of the costs and benefits of legal rules and
therefore the balance of incentives amongst potential litigants. If for example the benefits of
an inefficient rule are concentrated on a small number of people and the costs are dispersed
across a large number then opportunism (in the form of rent seeking behaviours) by those
who stand to benefit most may lead to the litigation processes being biased in favour of the
inefficient rule. Conversely if the benefits of efficient rules are dispersed, then because the
costs of litigating are concentrated, opportunism (this time in the form of free riding
behaviours by those who may benefit from a change to the rule but who wish to avoid the
costs of changing it) may lead to sub-optimal rates of litigation in favour of more efficient
rules. Basically no potential beneficiary of litigation may be willing to come forward to
litigate for a more efficient rule.
The above suggests that the efficiency of the common law will depend on a number of
factors. It may not be a proposition which is generally sustainable in all circumstances.
Thus in some situations it may be better to leave matters to private ordering, or look at other
methods of social organisation.
Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges" (1980) 19 Journal of Legal Studies 139; S Shavell
"Suit Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation
of Legal Costs" (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 55; and S Shavell "The Social versus the Private
Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System" (1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 333.
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C The Analysis of Representative Government
The other main option, or form of state intervention, chosen in most western economies
for overcoming the problems of social organisation is representative democracy. So far we
have seen that there is clearly scope for poor outcomes to emerge which a representative
government might seek to address. Since the Second World War moreover the size of
representative governments and the nature of their involvement in the economy has grown
and changed rapidly. In this section we assess:
• the nature of this involvement in terms of the interventions a representative government
has at its disposal and their likely effects; and
• the general sources of potential failures in such interventions
1 The Instruments of Government Policy and their E#ects
Taxes, subsidies, regulations and government ownership are all examples of instruments
by which a state specifies the rights of individuals. Taxes determine an individual's right to
income accruing from the use of a particular resource. Subsidies similarly affect this right,
and since subsidies to one individual must be financed by taxes on other citizens (fiscal or
inflationary), or by debt to be paid back by taxes on future citizens, subsidies define rights
or relationships between people. Regulation here is taken to cover both Acts of Parliament
and Orders in Council. They clearly are used to define rights. Government ownership
similarly defines rights between individuals.
Typically the Government rarely acts through one instrument, but through mixes of them.
For example when a government regulates it usually becomes the owner of a regulatory
agency and spends money on it. Rather than speaking of government instruments or
interventions it is perhaps more useful to speak of a policy framework or a government
policy. In the following few pages however we briefly discuss the effects of the main policy
instruments - namely expenditure, taxation, regulation and state ownership - separately.
We further discuss the option of devolving decisions to local democratic control.
In each case the discussion focuses on the general nature of each instrument and the
problems each engender, not on the question of what is the best policy to adopt in relation to
particular problems such as public goods, or monopolies. It is not possible to answer such
questions in a general way, rather one needs to approach each area on a case by case basis,
wary of the problems likely to arise with government intervention, and thereby utilising a
comparative systems approach.
The method used to examine the effect of a particular government instrument (such as
taxes, subsidies, etc) is in terms of its effect on the constraints individuals face, and
therefore the incentives they create, and their consequent effect on the behaviour of
economic actors.
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Taxation
The efficiency effects of taxation arise through the way they change the incentives facing
individuals and firms. Where general taxation (PAYE, GST) is used to support particular
expenditures, and thereby support certain rights of some individuals (eg in access to
education) in a general way, then the costs of raising the taxes need to be evaluated and
minimised. General taxation used to finance such expenditure for example will create
disincentives to work, save and invest, and encourage economically wasteful activities
aimed at avoiding tax.34 These outcomes need to be evaluated and minimised both when
taxation policies are considered and when evaluating the benefits from expenditure
programmes.
The great majority of taxation is of a general form designed primarily to support general
government expenditure policies as above. Taxation however can be more specifically
targeted, or used as an instrument to deter particular actions (eg pollution), or protect the
rights of others. In this case it is important to evaluate not only the effects of the taxation on
the targeted behaviour but also, what is done with the revenue and the economic effects of
the use made of the expenditure on incentives and behaviours of other agents.
Expenditure
The efficiency costs of expenditure can be direct or indirect. The direct efficiency costs
of a subsidy arise through the way it alters incentives for individuals. Subsidies may
discourage work, or encourage investment in areas where it would not otherwise have been
undertaken. There will thus typically be a forgone activity or opportunity cost that needs
to be incorporated into decision making that involves government expenditure. This will
critically depend on the method used to deliver expenditure. Thus the terms on which
government money is made available to individuals (eg beneficiaries), or the terms on which
the Government's purchases of outputs from firms are negotiated or regulated, will critically
affect incentives and outcomes.
Expenditure moreover needs to be financed. The indirect costs of expendifure will thus
also depend on the way it is financed. These costs will have to borne by economic actors,
and essentially illustrate the interdependent nature of the economy. The indirect efficiency
costs of financing expenditure when taxation is used were discussed in the last subsection.
Alternative financing mechanisms however include debt financing and the creation of
money.
The indirect efficiency costs of debt financing relate to the effect that public sector
borrowing has on the supply of capital and rate of savings in the economy. These are
34 For an analysis of the costs of raising taxes in New Zealand see W E Diewert and D A Lawrence
The Marginal Costs of Taxation in New Zealand (Swan Consultants (Canberra) Pty Ltd, 1994).
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affected through various mechanisms but primarily through interest rates and expectations.
Large public sector debt programmes put pressure on interest rates that adversely crowd
out private sector activity. Debt financing will also place a burden on future generations
and therefore have intergenerational equity effects.35
If expenditure is financed by creating money it will cause inflationary pressures
involving efficiency and equity effects. If the inflationary effects of expanding money supply
to finance expenditure are not anticipated by economic agents (eg built into interest rates)
then it may create advantages for borrowers, and disadvantages for savers and lenders -
with potentially adverse effects for borrowing and saving decisions. The inflation created
by this means of funding expenditure will also tend to increase the uncertainty facing firms
making investment decisions. This is true to the extent they will have difficulty judging
whether price rises are general or relate only to their own markets.
Regulation
Regulation6 by central government also can be used to define the rights and obligations
of individuals. Provision then needs to be made for the rights and obligations to be
administered or enforced, which may occur by administrative agencies and/or the courts.
Regulations effectively impose a quasi-tax or cost on some, and confer a quasi-subsidy on
others. They can then have adverse efficiency effects if they allocate rights poorly, or
reduce exclusivity of property rights; if they prevent more effective private arrangements
emerging by raising the costs of contracting, or create barriers to mutually beneficial trades
where they are appropriate; and if they fail to provide for the successful administration or
enforcement of rights. They can also potentially have equity effects if they serve to protect
privilege, or prevent access to opportunities of some groups.
State Ownership
A further instrument for government policy involves the assumption of ownership rights
over agencies or firms. This gives government residual property rights over the assets of the
firm, and therefore rights to directly control decisions relating to the income, use and
transfer of the assets. As indicated in the earlier section on private arrangements,
ownership may be appropriate where there are significant costs to contracting between
autonomous agents. An owner of a firm or organisation may typically have access to better
35 For an analysis of the fiscal burden that current New Zealand policies will impose on future
generations see A J Auerbach, B Baker, L J Kotlikof and Walliser, "Generational Accounting in
New Zealand: Is There Generational Balance" (1995) Paper presented to NZ Economist
Association Conference, Lincoln University, August 1995.
36 The term is used here in the broad sense as adopted by economists. For a seminal article on the
economic analysis of regulation see G J Stigler "The Economic Theory of Regulation" (1971) 2 Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science 3.
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information and achieve greater adaptability in securing supply. However while
ownership can be beneficial it can also be costly. Fundamentally the incentives of managers
and employees of organisations are difficult to align with the goals (of the owners) of the
organisation. This arises because of the problem of opportunism. Individual members of
organisations have a tendency to pursue their own goals, to shirk and to featherbed, and to
pay insufficient care in the use of resources that are owned by "the organisation" or
someone else. This category of problems with ownership can be classed as principal-agent
problems.
Whereas firms engaged in competitive or contestable markets supplying goods to a
consumer face checks on their behaviour and need to ultimately serve consumers as well as
other firms can, a state owned enterprise even in a contestable market can have greater
leeway. This results ultimately from the fact that the state as owner has a tendency to
underwrite losses and a greater capacity to do so through its ability to tax. While some
checks involved in the managerial market or the ability to hire and fire managers are present
for both state and privately owned organisation, state owned organisations lack some of
the controls present in most private firms and are frequently given conflicting objectives.37
Large private firms on the other hand are typically open corporations, with their shares
being traded on the capital market. If managers in a company do not maximise the goals of
owners the company's share price will tend to fall. The value of the capital assets, or cash
flow of the firm in alternative uses will at some point eventually exceed the share price and
a takeover bid is likely to follow. The first change a successful takeover company is likely
to make is to restructure the organisation and fire existing managers. This capital market
check then serves to keep managers of private firms from pursuing sub goals and provides a
mechanism through which control and monitoring systems are improved. These checks do
not exist in the state sector to the same extent.
Ownership therefore has costs and the point to be borne in mind is that frequently social
objectives may be more efficiently achieved through subsidies or taxes, or regulation of
privately owned companies or contracts with them, rather than through state ownership. In
those areas where the state cannot adequately secure an objective without ownership or
there are net gains to ownership, then the state needs to be concerned on an ongoing basis to
review and improve its internal management control systems.
Local Democratic Control
Local democratic decision making is frequently proposed as a possible alternative
means for resolving conflicting interests and achieving collective goals, while avoiding
many of the problems of extensive central government involvement. When local
37 As a result not only is there a lack of incentives or rewards for monitoring, monitoring is more
difficult or costly.
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democratically elected units result from private arrangements the relevant perspectives for
assessing such outcomes are those discussed earlier in relation to voluntary associations.
Devolution of decision making power by central government to locally elected bodies
through a centrally determined legislative framework however is the focus of our attention
here. Although in effect it represents a case where the various instruments described above
are being used in unison, the devolution of decision control to a local democratic unit
warrants its treatment as effectively a separate policy instrument of a unitary central state
such as that which exists in New Zealand.
The main advantage offered for decentralising control to local bodies is the likelihood
that better solutions will result if those making decisions are close to the problems being
addressed. This is based on the notion that those who have the information should make the
decisions. The existence of different jurisdictions offering different mixes of output, quality
and cost then enables voters to vote with their feet, as well as through the ballot box to
ensure accountability of decision making.38 This argument is used in support of all forms of
decentralisation.
There are a number of reasons however for concern with the effectiveness of this
particular institutional option. Fundamentally there is a need to be sensitive to the method
by which decentralisation is achieved in these matters.39 In many cases the local electorate
typically appears to exhibit weak interest in the prudent use of resources by elected
managers. This is so, particularly, in cases where central government provides the bulk of
resources which the local body administers. It is possible to suggest that so long as either or
both the expenditure or control exercised by the local body is laid down from the centre the
local electorate is likely to be relatively divorced from or disinterested in the management
process. So long as the finance for expenditure is not raised locally by the local body, and
so long as the source of the body's ultimate control does not lie with the body itself but with
the centre, the local electorate is likely to exhibit less interest in holding the locally elected
members to account. A kind of rational disinterest may be expected to prevail.
2 The Limits to Representative Government
We identified earlier the problems of scarcity, interdependence, bounded rationality,
information costs and poor incentives which can undermine the effectiveness of private
arrangements. Exactly the same problems that compound or undermine private
arrangements, however, undermine attempts at finding central government solutions through
the above instruments. Thus central government attempts to improve the outcomes of private
38 On voting with feet see C M Tiebout "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures" (1956) 64 Journal of
Political Economy 416.
39 For a discussion of the issue of allocating different functions to different jurisdictions see W E
Oates Fiscal Federalism (Harcourt Brace, London, 1972).
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arrangements, or supplant private endeavours to solve the basic problems of scarcity and
interdependence are similarly constrained by scarcity of resources, interdependencies,
bounded rationality, information costs and incentive problems. In many ways, however, the
problems may be more severe. Let us then turn to consider the problems facing central
government decision-making.
The problem of scarcity may be exacerbated by central government. As we have just seen
its policies may distort the incentives of individuals who are affected by the interventions.
Thus as just outlined all government policy instruments tend to have adverse effects, and are
not costless. Similarly the state's attempts to deal with interdependencies may in fact create
worse outcomes. In part this reflects the basic fact of interdependency in the economy. As
we have seen an intervention in one market may have adverse consequences elsewhere that
are unforeseen.
To set the stage for analysing the sources of government failure in confronting these
problems, we begin with a government based on direct democracy (no representative
government). If we assume a world of direct voting on a single issue under simple majority
rule,40 under these conditions it can be shown that the median voter's preferences will be
decisive in determining the collective outcome.41 But there is nothing in the voting process to
ensure the median voter's decision is the efficient one.42
The sources of inefficiencies arising from government are even more complex when we go
to a system of representative democracy. Like private individuals, decisions makers in a
representative government will face difficulties dealing with the problems of scarcity and
interdependencies that underly problems of social organisation. The reason of course is
40 For a discussion of the costs of decision making under alternative collective decision rules to
majority rule see J M Buchanan & G Tullock The Calculus of Consent (University of Michigan Press,
Ann Arbor, 1962).
41 For simplicity we are ignoring the problems of stability of majority rule outcomes. Majority rule can
result in what is known as cyclical outcomes - outcomes that vary depending on the ordering of
presentation of choices - when voters preferences are not single peaked. See Duncan Black, "On
the Rationale of Group Decision Making" 1948 56 Journal of Political Economy 133; and Anthony
Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper Row, New York, 1957)
42 The decision about the desired government intervention (eg expenditure or regulation) depends
on the individual's perceived benefits from the intervention and her expected share of any cost
(eg in taxes or forgone output) for a given level of intervention. For the median voter's choice to
be efficient, however the sum of all the benefits across all voters from an intervention must be
equal to the marginal cost of the intervention. Further each individual's cost shares must be
adjusted so the cost price is equal to the benefits she perceives from the level of intervention
chosen by the median voter. Any divergence will tend to lead to inefficiency. A further source
of inefficiency arises when the voting population does not coincide with the tax paying
population.
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that the state is made up of individuals subject to the same limitations as private economic
actors.
Indeed the problem arising from the bounded rationality of individuals may be more
significant when one considers central decision making or planning. Even assuming central
planners are as rational or more rational than others in the economy, a number of problems
are likely to undermine the efficacy of central decision making. Given the typically
economy-wide effects of government actions, and the complexity of the problem solving state
decision makers are expected to engage in, more severe demands may be placed on their
bounded rationality than is the case for private planning.
Centralised decision making will also face major information disabilities. The
information relevant to a central planning decision may be hard to obtain. The information
relevant will typically be diverse, and may include unavailable information on consumer
preferences, or alternative production technologies, or alternative ways of organising
activities. Alternatively information may be possessed by individuals who are difficult to
locate, or be of a nature that is difficult to communicate from one agent to another. If
information is difficult to transfer then this means that it will be difficult to both acquire
information at the centre relevant to decisions to be made, and then disseminate that
information from the centre to the agents who are to carry out plans. The information costs
underlying centralised decision making therefore militate against its successful execution. It
is likely to be based on incomplete information with consequent adverse effects.
In a decentralised setting individuals accept risks, make judgements and adapt to
unexpected occurrences, with those who are caught out suffering the consequences of their
mistakes, and those who adopt successful strategies benefiting. There are thus strong
incentives for individuals to seek out successful strategies, with successful strategies being
likely to survive, thereby benefiting the system. In comparison with central planning,
mistakes tend to be costly and impact on everyone, with few alternatives being available
when things go wrong. The only safeguard is conscious and purposive policy review.
Incentives to undertake this effectively however, in order to conserve on scarce resources
may generally be weak within the state, given the fact that state decision makers may not
bear all the costs of poor decisions. The state's ability to tax may mean its decision-makers
do not really face the true cost of resources with consequences for its use of resources and
for other sectors in the economy. Similarly when it regulates or owns resources or
organisations its incentives to efficiently monitor the effects of these policies on the use of
scarce resources may be weak.
The incentive problems undermining decision making in'the state' in relation to property
rights go deeper than this however. We have already noted that opportunism creates
incentive problems for private arrangements. Opportunism in the context of central
government decision-making and planning may exhibit itself in the form of political favours,
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featherbedding and waste of public resources. These problems are fundamental to an
evaluation of the most suitable level and form of centralised state decision making in a
society. The mechanisms through which opportunism and incentive problems generally
work in the state are in fact more subtle and complex than are widely appreciated.
On the one hand definitions of property rights impact on the overall growth of the
economy, on the other hand they impact on the rents accruing to particular groups. If
coalitions of individuals can either gain direct control of the property rights defining power
of the state or bargain with the state to change property rights (for example Federated
Farmers, Business Roundtable, the trade union movement) then they can affect the value of
their property rights, or acquire better rights (through tariffs, taxation, subsidies or
legislation).
From the redistributive societies of ancient Egyptian dynasties, through Greek and
Roman times, to the medieval manor, there was a persistent tension between the ownership
structure that maximised the rents to the ruler or particular groups, and an efficient and
equitable system that encouraged economic growth and social equity.43 The dominance of
agriculture in the western world prior to the nineteenth century resulted in struggles to
control the state being associated with the distribution of landed wealth and income. Over
more recent time, changes in the dominant interests within society, and the growth of
pluralism have been associated with the radical changes in relative prices stemming from the
Industrial Revolution. These changes have generated different outcomes in terms of
property rights conflicts. The decline in the relative importance of land rent (and the
landlord), the growth of manufacturing and services, and the growing share of income going
to labour, transformed the structure of production and created new interest groups.
Property rights conflicts may appear more subtle now that they are largely not
associated with tangible resources like land, and also more complex given a pluralistic
society. The nature of the interventions affecting the value and distribution of property
rights are also far more developed including taxation, government expenditure, regulation
and legislation. However conflicts of interest and the state's role in resolving them are no
less critical to the efficiency and equity of our economy than earlier ones. The state is a
double edged sword. It can pursue generally accepted social goals or it can be diverted to
pursuing the interests of particular groups.
In general government policy faces the danger of two types of capture:
43 D C North Structure and Change in Economic History (WN Norton, New York, 1981) for an analysis
of economic history from an institutional perspective.
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(a) Capture from external sources - that is, lobby groups;44
(b) Capture from internal sources - that is, its own bureaucracy.45
The mechanisms of policy capture and safeguards against it need to be continually
reviewed.
One of the clear ways through which inappropriate policy may result from external
capture lies in the differential effects of policies on people. Frequently benefits are
concentrated on particular groups while the costs of the policy may be dispersed. This sets
up a dynamic process where those who benefit from the policy find it easier to organise and
lobby for its introduction and maintenance, while those who bear the costs of the policy
find it too difficult to organise an effective opposition.
The relation between a government and its own bureaucracy on the other hand can be
described as a bilateral monopoly. It can be suggested however that the relation favours the
bureaucracy, that elected representatives are at a disadvantage in relation to their own
bureaucracy simply because of an information asymmetry.46 The problem that the
bureaucracy may hold better information about how government services actually operate
creates the potential for opportunism by the bureaucracy including shirking, budget
maximisation and generally inefficient policies for society as a whole.
Thus the main factors that will influence the extent, nature and outcome of central
government intervention in New Zealand are:
(a) the nature of representative government adopted, including the powers of the
executive and its relationship to Parliament, and questions relating among other
things to a Bill of Rights and the electoral system; and
(b) the structure, organisation and accountability of the civil service
Propositions about what services the government ought to finance are reduced in
relevance in the absence of an analysis of how the above sybtem actually performs.
Similarly however questions about how the government should deliver whatever services
are deemed necessary require an assessment of the way government delivery actually
works, what are the pressures exerted upon it - what are the constraints, the relationships
between action and outcome, and the preferences underlying government activities. For
44 For a formal model of interest group lobbying and references see Becker, "A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence" (1983) 98 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 371.
45 See W Niskanen Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Aldine, Chicago, 1971) for a seminal
economic analysis of this point.
46 See Niskanen.
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example what are the consequences of maximising behaviour on the part of economic agents
within the government's bureaucracies.
A comparative systems analysis on government itself would distinguish the effect of
alternative institutional arrangements on incentives and information and thus on behaviour
at two levels:
(a) the political institutions which express the preferences for public services;
(b) the bureaucratic or other state organisations which supply these services.
The integration of these two elements, or the process of exchange between these
institutions, how it is structured and conducted is a further focus of attention. The key
element here is the nature of the relation and the implications of this for management
systems.
V Conclusion
The analysis of government and government policy needs to be based on a comparative
institutional approach. This approach invites assessing alternative instifutional structures
(both private and governmental) according to the processes and outcomes they involve,
utilising generally accepted criteria for making social choices. This will require in depth
consideration of the goals of our society and of the means to achieve them. In comparing
different means or institutions one should assess primarily:
(a) their efficiency implications by examining in particular:
(i) the incentives they create;
(ii) their effect on the efficient use of information;
(iii) the evolutionary or dynamic adaptability characteristics of the institution;
and
(b) their equity implications by examining:
(i) their effect on the opportunities of individuals;
(ii) their effect on the fairness of outcomes;
(iii) their effect on the fairness of processes.
A comparative systems approach is "level headed" about the limits of government, and
the limits of private arrangements, eschews the blind pursuit of ideal worlds by recognising
trade-offs between goals, and places emphasis on a detailed microanalytic approach or,
simply, attention to detail including empirical evidence and argument. The comparative
systems approach to policy formation moreover suggests that there may be little one can say
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about the appropriate "level" of government involvement in the economy, whether it should
be more or less, without conducting a comparative systems analysis in every area of policy.
The comparative approach to formulating policy then involves two steps. Firstly
identify the objectives and rationale of government policy with an emphasis on identifying
clearly the nature of the problems it seeks to address. Any claimed problem with private
arrangements should be subjected to detailed scrutiny. In the past the limits of private
contracting have often been overstated. The need for empirical research, or information and
analysis of private arrangements that may deal with perceived problems is central. It
should not be assumed for example that particular groups are not competent to look after
their own interest without some convincing evidence that extends beyond anecdotal
observation. Further, every perceived problem should be subjected to detailed analysis as
to its causes. For instance, claims that there are divergences between social and private
costs are not useful ways to express many perceived problems.
Secondly it is not sufficient to establish that a problem exists; it is also essential to
establish that government can improve things. The essential element in policy formulation is
therefore a detailed comparative systems approach. This comparative analysis needs to be
based on an evaluation of the full impact of a government policy over time and its
consequent impact on other areas of the economy. This suggests the need to avoid partial
analysis of policy interventions and to adopt a more critical attitude to the likely hidden or
secondary effects of any policy, given the problems of interdependencies repeatedly pointed
to in this paper.
In the design of policy, a comparative institutional approach moreover suggests that
attention should focus on minimising the problem of "government failure". Tendencies for
governments to fail in the achievement of generally accepted objectives and for them to
pursue other objectives can it suggests be reduced; although not eliminated, by institutional
design based on a comparative systems analysis of the way the government organises itself.
In undertaking this analysis the basic principles to keep in mind are:
(a) Clar* objectives: It is important that the objectives underlying any particular area of
government activity are clear.
(b) Transparency: There is a need to ensure that there is transparency not only in the
objectives being pursued but also the means by which objectives are to be achieved.
This implies for instance the need to make explicit possibly hidden subsidies.
(c) Avoidance of capture: There is a need to minimise scope for the capture of government
policy when designing both the structure and processes used to formulate and deliver
government policy.
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(d) Incentives: There is a need to ensure incentives on individuals in the state are aligned
to the achievement of government goals.
(e) Information: It is important that efficient use is made of information, and that the costs
of information are adequately recognised.
(f) Accountability: The design of incentive and information systems should attempt to
enhance accountability of the government's agents to their principals namely Ministers
and ultimately the electorate.
(g) Contestability: Where possible in order to enhance both incentives and the efficient use
of information, contestability of both policy advice and service delivery should be
encouraged, either externally or internally.
Noble and clear objectives are not all that is needed for a government to perform well. It
also requires a clear understanding of the nature and effects of its policy instruments and of
the potential and the limitations of both private arrangements and central control.
